My generation was born into an era when the world was divided into haves and have-nots, the former taking for granted their continuing and increasing prosperity, and the latter not entertaining much hope of catching up. In the last few years we have experienced a basic shake-up in our beliefs and analyses. The economic supremacy of the West is being challenged not only by Japan but also by the ASEAN NICs -South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia. If the dynamism of China continues at the rate it has been during the past decade, it will be a majör contender by the beginning of the 21st century. The optimism has become contagious. Many countries like Indonesia, Mexico, Brazil, Chile and Turkey are also feeling more confıdent that they have a good chance of cathing up with the West.
the Western countries, especially in the U.S. 1 The share of manufacturing in total value added is going down in the U.S. as well as in Europe. Some economists do not see much to worry about in this trend drawing attention to the rising share of services. But there are increasing signs that the growth of services is also affected when the goods production base stagnates.
The short or medium term trends of economic growth in each country or region have been explained by the traditional theories that focus on growth determinants such as investments -both physical and human -and economic policies. But more fundamental forces appear to be in action for determining long term trends. For a long period in history, the rise and fail of economic powers were associated with the richness of natural endowmentsincluding the climate -and military might. Trade routes connecting majör sources and users of primary and manufactured goods were always considered important but it was left to Adam Smith and the Classical economists to highlight and define more vigorously the benefits of trade among countries. Up to the eighteenth century the opening of new trade routes and disruption of the old ones explained to a large degree the rise and fail of the economic fortunes of the nations.
While highlighting the more immediate grovvth determinants and constraints, these types of explanations do not provide strong clues as to vvhy Europe and North America achieved high levels of prosperity during the last two centuries and vvhy others did not. Nor are causes of relative shift of economic gravity from the West to the East easier to understand using these tools of analysis. This essay aims at analyzing the more basic causes of these trends:
(a) Why did the gap between the industrialised countries and the rest of the world widen so much över the past two centuries? (b) Why did international trade not help to narrow this gap? (c) What are the implications of much faster diffusion of technologies for the future prospects of the rich and the poor countries?
It has become increasingly evident that one of the most significant continuities in social and economic life, linking the past two centuries to the next, will be the process of industrialization. This connotes industrialization in a broad sense, that is, the techniccal progress which enriches the transformation of human and natural endowments to betler serve the needs 27 and wants of societies. In this respect it covers, in addition to industry proper, the technical progress embodied in agriculture and services as well.
Technical progress has been a facet of human history from the very beginning. The discovery of various metals, energy sources and the inventions of tools especially the wheel, were no doubt comparable in their relative welfare contributions to the technological advances of recent times. But what distinguishes the last two centuries has been the quantum jump in the utilization of energy sources, raw materials and capital equipment to produce a vast variety of manufactured items.
2 No only did the industrial revolution increase the importance of production compared to trade as a source of value added, but commerce itself became more dependent on industry than on natural resources, especially in value terms. Technological advances were central to both industrialization and to the speed of development.
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The countries which fırst achieved technical progress or the indusrial revolution and those which joined the club early on reaped the benefıts of productivity increase manifold över what their natural resource or unskilled human endowments would have yielded.
4 Through this process, countries, and within countries groups of populations, enjoyed the benefıts of technical progress, of course supplemented also by the accumulation of assets. In simple language they became rich. In terms of per capita income growth, the experience of Western Europe and North America during the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century was unique. The haves and have-nots dichotomy of the world that our generation inherited was, to a very large extent, the result of differences in technical progress.
2 "What distinguishes the world since the industrial revolution from the world before is the systematic, regular and progressive application of science and technology to the production of goods and services. The recognition of the gap that exists betvveen the living standards of countries as an economic issue, however, is a more recent phenomenon and vvas hardly in the public consciousness before the Second World War. In the century and a half of industrialization preceding the Second World War, the relative poverty of a large part of the worid under colonial rule or in similar backvvard situations was perceived as a topic in political development or as issues pertaining to people vvho vvere in their pre-civilized state. And the differences in living standards appeared as a civilization gap rather than an economic phenomenon. An example of this mind set is reflected, for example, in the vvork of a liberal such as John Stuart Mili vvhen he talks of "those backvvard states of society in vvhich the race itself may be considered in its nonage".
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Recognition of the prosperity differentials among nations as an economic issue after the Second World War gave rise to much thinking and theorising on development economics that we are familiar vvith. The role of international trade vvas re-emphasized and codified. Great importance vvas attached to capital accunıulation and investment choice. Physical and human infrastructure and appropriate government policies vvere also highlighted as important variables of development models. The role of technology vvas not totally absent from the grovvth models but it vvas usually treated -mostly implicitly-as embodied in human capital. Some attempts by economists to see technical progress separately from social evolution vvere not totally absent as in the case of Schumpeter's theory of economic development vvhere he put the emphasis on "entrepreneurial innovation". But even this concept vvas conceived as deeply rooted in the human development of the country. The thought that it could be exported to other countries vvas not central to these paradigms.
My generation vvas taught to believe that technical progress vvas an organic process and that the industrial revolution in the West vvas the culmination of centuries of accumulation of science, basic research and human attitudes, nurtured in a milieu of Calvinist ethics and that its replication in the less developed vvorld be a matter of many generations, if at ali feasible. It appeared for a long vvhile that catching up vvith the West vvas an empty dream since the gap vis-a-vis industrialized countries vvould continue vvidening. Hence, those concerned vvith the problems of the less developed vvorld vvere resigned to setting their strategies at more modest goals of reducing poverty but not even thinking of challenging the economic supremacy of the West.
Pure economic theory produced some clues that could challenge this fatalistic attitude. One such important clue came from the Factor Price Equalization Theorem. Bertil Ohlin argued as early as 1933 that although free mobility of factor inputs in international trade will equalize factor returns ali the way, free mobility of goods can serve only to move factor prices tovvard (but not ali the way to) factor equalization. Paul Samuelson was not satisfıed with this proposition.
6 He demonstrated that under certain assumptions such as zero transport costs, no complete specialization in either country and with the same laws of knowledge operative everywhere, mobility of goods would result in full factor price equalization even when factors were not mobile between countries.
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The experience of a century or more, hovvever, had shown that this had not happened in a big way. The factor prices among the poor and the rich countries had not converged. On the contrary, they had moved further apart. Realising this, Samuelson had prefaced his seminal article by a caveat: "I cannot pretend to present a balanced appraisal of the bearing of this analysis upon interpreting the actual world, because my own mind is not made up in this question: on the one hand, I think it wotıld be folly to come to any startling conclusions on the basis of so simplifıed a model and such abstract reasoning; but on the other hand, strong simple cases often point the way to an element of truth present in a complex situation." 8 There were, however, some examples of factor price equalizalion which had taken place. The industrial revolution, which started essentially in England, jumped to France, Germany, the United States and later to Japan. But Europe and the United States were often seen as offshoots of England, and Japan was treated as a special case. Until the recent couple of decades, the increasing gap between the real wages of these countries and the rest of the world for almost two centuries when international trade was largely unrestricted and capital was quite mobile presented at least a majör puzzle about, if not an empirical negation of the factor-price equalization theorem. n 'An interesting story connected with this is worth repeating. When Professor Lionel Robbins saw this article in print, he remembered a paper that one of his former students, Abba Lerner, had presented in his seminar in 1933. He dug out the paper and published it in Econometrica. Like many important theorems, it looks like simple common sense after it has been thought through. If wage differentials within a country are minör, why should there be such large differences in real wages across countries? Schumpeter had argued that profıts which were returns to entrepreneurial innovation would be wiped out through competition, and the Samuelson-Lerner Theorem showed that free mobility of goods (competition) would equalize factor prices even when factors were immobile. 8 P. A. Samuelson, "International Factor-Price EquaIization Once Again", Economic Journal, 1949. Samuelson himself expressed, many years later, further doubts about the relevance of his famous theorem to the real world. In an article entitled "Ohlin Was Right", he said: "Men receive lower wages in some countries than others for a variety of reasons -because their effective know-how is limited and manner of their being combined with other productive factors is not optimal. In the face of hard facts it would be rash to consider the existing distribution of population to be optimal in any sense, or to regard free trade as a panacea for the present geographical inequalities." The developments of the recent decades, however, have changed this perception and may vvarrant an article that would be entitled "Samuelson and Lemer Were Right After Ali." Follovving Japan, we have vvitnessed the rapid development of other East Asian countries-Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia and China. In ali these countries the real wages have risen at very high rates. Real wages have also increased significantly in many other developing countries. Parallel with this, the growth rate has slovved down in the industrial West. So, after ali, a process of factor equalization is taking place.
Both the abscnca of factor price equalization trends in the past two centuries and the emergence of these tendencies in the recent past have a great deal to do vvith the transfer of technology. Indeed, a crucial assumption of the factor-price equalization theorem, though not attracting much attention at the time, was that "the same laws of knowledge were operative everyvvhere" (Samuelson) or that "the same technical knowledge was available in both countries" (Lemer). Both the limited transmission of industrialization can be explained, at one level, by the majör change that has taken place in the speed of technology transfer.
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Accelerated speed of technology transfer came about mostly as a by product of the communications revolution, which was itself a result of technological progress. Dramatic inventions and innovations in the communications technology have introduced a quantum jump in the diffusion of technical know-how, qualilatively different from what was the case in the past. On the results side, it took more than 50-60 years for the other countries to learn from the United States how to manufacture automobiles whereas the monopoly on the computer technology hardly lasted 15-20 years. Not only have Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore learnt how to imitate the latest processes of modern technology, but they have improved the quality of Western products in many areas. An interesting example of competitive labour markets even in the absence of labour mobility is the accounting and auditing work which gets done by the Indians for the American companies vvorking through computer networks, without even leaving Calcutta for a day! These experiences bring in a sense of self confıdence to and open up new horizons for the under-developed countries. Increasingly, the analysts no longer look at the prerequisites of industrial revolution as the product of cultural evolutions spanning centuries, but of learning efforts which can be accomplished in a short time. Replicating modern industrial techniques is both easy and can be fast -perhaps as argued many years ago by Arthur Lewis, easier and faster than adopting new agricultural skills. Many East Asian countries have achieved majör industrial transformations in almost one generation, and China is also moving fast on this route.
The interesting phenomenon of our day is not only that the learning process has become much faster pulling up the real wages in many developing countries -a process widely perceived and analyzed in recent years-but, equally important, that the factor-price equalization process is putting pressure on the real wages in the West to fail -an implication of the process stili not fully recognized. The discussion of economic development has usually been in trems of catching up, that is, rising incomes in developing countries towards the higher levels in industrialized countries. But there is nothing in the theorem to rule out the symmetry of the factor equalization process, that is adjustment taking place partly by rising real wages in the developing countries and partly through falling real wages in advanced countries. This also follows from common sense. Given the high skill and technology content of many items of manufacturirıg and the trend towards a much faster technology transfer (learning process) the differential costs of manufactured items betvveen countries vvill tend to reflect relative levels of real vvages. If this is true to a large extent, is it at ali surprising that the goods manufactured in the developing countries vvith the same techniques but vvith labor vvhose real vvages are 30-40 times lovver than the real vvages in advanced countries vvill present a severe competition to the industry of the latter?
These observations have far reaching implications for both the rich and the poor countries. The rich countries are becoming increasingly avvare of the threat to them that comes from the rapid globalization of technology. Questions are being raised about the validity of the classical premise that free trade benefıts ali parties. Some argue that the static comparative advantage models may not hold in a rapidly changing vvorld vvhere increasing retums, steeper learning functions or, as proposed in this essay, faster transfer of technology have become important. Thus, the interventionist argument promoted by the so called "new trade theory", 11 the "boomerang effeet" elaborated by Shinahora 12 and the characterization of trade betvveen U.S. and Japan as a zero-sum game by Lester Thurovv ali direct our attention to the erosion of technology induced rents in the advanced countries. The stiff competition comes from the less advanced countries that are acquiring the know-how at a rapid pace and combining it vvith cheap labour.
With hindsight, one can argue that this is not a nevv phenomenon. For example, Shinahora say s: "Most probably it (the boomerang effeet) vvas povverfully at vvork vvhen Germany and Japan began to challenge British economic supremacy, and also vvhen the United States took över vvorld economic hegemony from Britain. It is the turn of the U.S. novv to feel the pain of the boomerang effeet in relation to Japan. The U.S. is suffering the consequences of the knovv-hovv it itself exported. In fact, the international transfer of technology is alvvays accompanied by the boomerang effeet."
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But in the last tvvo decades the speed and the spread of technology transfer has become more global and pronounced.
The repercussions of the loss of technological superiority are noticeable not only on the factory floor. The import of cheaper cars, electronics or garments, in the first instance, appear to threaten only the high vvage employment in localities such as Detroit, Silicon Valley or Manchester. The industrial vvorkers are, no doubt, the direct casualties. But the rents of early technological advance and the monopoly surpluses from it did not accrue only to the factory vvorkers and capitalists but permeated to the high salaries of vvhite collar employees crovvding the skyscrapers of the Western cities, fıve star hotels and first elass lounges ali över the world. These high earnings are also being threatened as already observed by the shrinking job markets in the Western countries. This is vvhy the fact of rising shares of services in the total value added seen in developed countries provides little consolation because the services are not independent of the rents of technology and the manufacturing base.
Under these circumstances it is not surprising that the proteetionist sentiments and efforts have been intensifying in advanced countries. These sentiments arise not only from the pressures of business vvhich suffer but from the intuitive realizations of the politicians -as opposed to economists-that, given the loss of technological monopoly, the free trade 11 The new trade theory puts less emphasis on the changed dynamics of technology transfer and more on market imperfeetions. Hence the need for industrial policy does not distinguish much between the more and less developed while the emphasis on technology tranfer introduces opposite implications for them. 12 Shinahora, op cit. 13 Ibld., p. 64. system does not amount to a plus sum game. The implications of the classical trade theory could stili be valid with trading countries being better off to specialize in their areas of comparative (not necessarily absolute advantage) but this would not be sufficient to guarantee the advanced countries significantly higher real vvages in industry. This is why free trade in today's dynamic world of rapid technology transfers, in the absence of complete specialization, increasingly exhibits the characteristics of a zero sum game. For each winner there is a loser and the winners are likely to be the countries that can combine universal technologies with cheap labour.
The defensive actions of the advanced countries have taken the forms of formal or informal trade barriers, the shift of enterprises to the countries with cheap labor and the creation or modifıcation of trading blocks. The effort to increase trade barriers has not succeeded as much as some have feared because of the pressures coming from majority constituencies of consumers not ready to give up cheaper and sometimes better quality goods. The shift of plants to low wage countries is a way out for firms but not a panacea to the İoss of employment opportunities in advanced countries or the pressure on their real vvages. The trading blocks approach vvill also not provide an effective defence against the competition coming from the low vvage countries. To the extent that such groupings include both advanced and less developed countries -like the North American Free Trade Area -they will speed up technology transfer with costs to the former and benefits to the latter. When the trading block is essentially a club of the early arrivers at industrial revolution -like the European Economic Community -the block members vvill continue to face the competition from the low vvage countries. The members of such trading blocks can be likened to people, caught in a fast flovving river, vvho hope to slovv dovvn their drift by holding hands.
Protectionist sentiments have not succeeded so far in increasing the trade barriers to any significant degree. Nor should vve expect protectionism to increase to any substantial degree.
14 Cheaper goods have an attraction to the masses of consumers vvho vvill, in general, vote dovvn the defenders of minority interests. Even if trade protection increases, it vvill neither stop the erosion of real vvages in the developed countries nor stop the rise in developing ones. The more likely scenario is that vve shall see various experiments vvith defensive adjustment programs to slovv dovvn the process.
On the other hand, the revolution in information and technology dissemination provides a great opportunity for the less developed countries. First, this new era presents an opportunity for the less developed countries and among them those with cheaper labor. One hears of the 1980's being the golden age when the world export growth rate was high and when many East Asian countries took advantage of this so-called export led growth. According to this line of thinking, some countries -i.e. in South Asia and Africa-as it were, "missed the train". If the analysis above regarding the process of factor-price equalization is plausible, this pessimism is unwarranted; there exist and will continue to exist opportunities for countries of low wages to achieve majör improvements in their standards of living. As observed above, some have already grasped this opportunity and achieved spectacular grovvüı and poverty reduction in a short time. But even this new revolution will not help the countries which do not have the basic preparation for benefitting from it. Prerequisites for benefitting from technology transfer include, at the minimum, (a) the basic institutions of governance -law and order and some degree of social compact, (b) openness to global markets and technologies and (c) an educated work force.
1 ^ Even without having the basic research and richness of basic inventions, poor countries can go a long way by adopting efficient technologies and combining them with their cheap labor.
It is encouraging to see that increasing numbers of the less developed countries are realizing the folly of segregating their economies from the global economy. The observations above suggest that the haves have more reason to conserve what they possess than the have-nots who should be open to every opportunity. But the crucial role of education is stili not fully appreciated in many parts of the world. In countries where the overall level of education is very poor as in some parts of Africa, no amount of opening up or getting the prices right or fiscal discipline will produce a perceptible or sustainable growth momentum. There are also countries of vast populations as in South Asia where a small (relative to population) cadre of the vvell educated class has been brought up while seriously neglecting basic education for more than half of the total population. In these countries, while some islands of development are taking place or vvill occur soon, this will not be sufficient for uplifting significantly the living standards of the illiterate majority of the population. Those who have little faith in the trickle down theories have a valid point vvhen it comes to the spread of prosperity to those 15 "We need to know what was the minimum social accompaniment and technical adjustment necessary if a country was to take advantage of the stock of potential innovations available in the modern world as in the past. One essential prerequisite was apparently a minimal literacy. Another was the minimal scale of enterprise necessary for engineering reasons. A third was that work should be allocated in terms of efficiency in performance and not for family connections." S. Kuznets in W.W. Rostow (ed.), The Economics of Take-Off into Sustained Grovvth.
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who are, as J.S. Mili called them, in the nogage of development. There is no factor vvhich correlates better with the growth rate of economies as an explanatory variable than basic education level. It is, therefore, no wonder that the East Asian countries going through their industrial revolution are also the most educated and literate as it happened in Europe two centuries ago. This hypothesis may also provide at least a partial explanation to a historical puzzle. The author has often vvondered why international trade, vvhich vvas completely free in the eighteenth and the tvventieth centuries, did not act as a transmitter of the industrial revolution to Turkey (or to India). The reason evidently lies in the absence of the minimum prerequisites.
In conclusion, it appears that the communication revolution has ushered in a second industrial revolution through the rapid spread of learning. Many implications as highlighted above are of great relevance for the future trends of the relative vvealth of nations. While the importance of the longterm tendencies and the opportunities that these present for the poorer countries cannot be exaggerated, the negative effects on the real incomes of the advanced countries vvill be gradual. The advantages of centuries of vvealth, modern science, technological advance, and vvell established institutions vvill keep Europe, for some decades to come, amongst the vvealthiest nations in the vvorld. In addition to the old vvorld heritages, the United States has the added advantage of vast natural resources, and Japan vvill benefıt from its very cohesive industrial vvork culture. These are also the countries vvhere populations do not grovv or grovv at a very slovv pace although the immigration from the poorer countries and the high population grovvth of the immigrant minorities in these countries vvill present increasing problems. Hovvever, vvhile the decline of real incomes vvill take a long time, the problems created by adjustments in this direction vvill dominate the content of their economic policies in the next fevv decades. The process predicted by the factor-price equalization theorem is taking place. It vvill not be able to change the relative prosperity of the nations overnight but the directions of relative change are irreversible and the opportunities are there for the poor nations who have the vvill to change.
